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ASSUMING RESPONSIBILITY: THOMAS F. EAGLETON, THE 
SENATE, AND THE BOMBING OF CAMBODIA 
JOEL K. GOLDSTEIN* 
INTRODUCTION 
The past has a way of repeating itself.  Events may not reoccur in the 
precise manner previously experienced; yet, the pattern often is sufficiently 
familiar to resemble one encountered before.  For those who experienced the 
Vietnam years, the war in Iraq carries some feeling of “déjà vu all over 
again.”1  There are differences, to be sure, yet a familiar pattern emerges—a 
failed discretionary war on foreign shores, executive use of manipulated 
intelligence to build support, the parade of shifting rationales offered to replace 
those exposed as unconvincing, the presidential deceit and dissembling, the 
legislative abdication. 
Thomas F. Eagleton spent the last years of his life preoccupied with the 
war in Iraq.  From the outset, he recognized it as an ill-conceived mission 
which could not be accomplished, as a disaster waiting to happen.  He 
witnessed from afar the executive overreaching and the congressional 
surrender.  He had seen it all before, during the 1960s and 1970s, in Vietnam.  
Eagleton was not part of the political leadership that blundered into Vietnam; 
instead, he went to the Senate in 1968 as an avowed dove anxious to extricate 
America from that debacle.  That effort became a central commitment of his 
extraordinary first term in the Senate.  The Eagleton Amendment to end the 
bombing of Cambodia was a significant event in that term. 
In early 1973, the United States, at long last, ended its military 
involvement in Vietnam.  Nonetheless, even after that war had ended, the 
parties had signed a peace treaty and the troops had come home, the United 
States military continued to rain bombs on Cambodia.  The debate over 
 
* Vincent C. Immel Professor of Law.  I had the privilege of teaching The Presidency and the 
Constitution with Tom Eagleton among other cherished associations with him.  I am grateful to 
Brian Atwood and Louis Fisher for comments on an earlier draft, to Brian Atwood and Walter F. 
Mondale for helpful conversations, to John Greffet and Margaret McDermott, J.D. for research 
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whether to prohibit American bombing of Cambodia in the spring of 1973 
presented one of the clearest tests of Congress’s willingness to flex its 
institutional prerogatives.  Nearly thirty-five years later, it is worth looking 
back at that episode to extract from it lessons to carry forward. 
This essay presents a case study of Tom Eagleton’s role in seeking to end 
the bombing of Cambodia.  It traces his contributions as the author and 
principal advocate of the Eagleton Amendment.  Eagleton sought both to end 
at long last America’s involvement in Southeast Asia and to force Congress to 
reassert its dormant war powers.  Eagleton put the issue on the legislative 
agenda in a meaningful way, he pushed his colleagues to come to grips with 
the challenges involved, and he was a central figure in the debate which 
ensued.  Eagleton’s efforts helped bring the war to an end, although six weeks 
later than his bill would have done.  He was less successful in persuading his 
colleagues to reassert the full scope of their constitutional power, although he 
did move them in that direction.  His performance displayed mastery of the 
political, moral, and constitutional arguments surrounding the issue.  It 
presented an example of a senator willing and able to think in a critical manner 
independent of an emerging consensus.  Ultimately, Eagleton encountered 
formidable institutional barriers which resisted easy movement. 
I.  THE CONTEXT OF THE EAGLETON AMENDMENT 
Decisions regarding war have often raised fundamental constitutional 
questions regarding the respective roles of the Executive and Legislative 
Branches.  Since the administration of Franklin D. Roosevelt, power has 
flowed to the Executive.  Under a familiar pattern, the Executive has played 
the dominant role in committing American troops to battle and has done so 
with nominal legislative involvement, or less.  Sometimes the President usurps, 
sometimes Congress abdicates, often both dynamics converge.2 
That was certainly our experience with Vietnam.  After years of 
acquiescence to presidential action, Congress handed President Lyndon B. 
Johnson essentially a blank check when it passed the Gulf of Tonkin 
Resolution on August 7, 1964.3  With little thought, discussion or dissent, the 
Resolution put Congress on record as supporting Johnson’s 
“determination . . . , as Commander in Chief, to take all necessary measures to 
repel any armed attack against the forces of the United States and to prevent 
further aggression.”4  Safeguarding the peace and security of Southeast Asia 
 
 2. See, e.g., HAROLD HONGJU KOH, THE NATIONAL SECURITY CONSTITUTION: SHARING 
POWER AFTER THE IRAN-CONTRA AFFAIR 117–18 (1990).  See generally Louis Fisher, War and 
Spending Prerogatives: Stages of Congressional Abdication, 19 ST. LOUIS U. PUB. L. REV. 7 
(2000). 
 3. See H.R.J. Res. 1145, 88th Cong., 110 CONG. REC. 18471 (1964) (enacted). 
 4. Id. 
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was deemed to be in America’s national interest and, accordingly, the United 
States was “prepared, as the President determines, to take all necessary steps, 
including the use of armed force” to assist any member of the Southeast Asia 
Collective Defense Treaty requesting military assistance.5 
Many members of Congress spent most of the next decade lamenting their 
votes and, in some cases, their personal involvement.  The regret was multi-
dimensional.  Vietnam proved a colossal foreign policy blunder as America 
ultimately stationed more than 500,000 men there at one time to fight a war 
with no rational purpose at great cost in American lives, limbs, and prestige.  It 
was a political miscalculation which diverted resources from domestic needs 
and badly divided the country.  And it represented an abdication of Congress’s 
constitutional powers as members of the House and Senate largely deferred to 
Johnson and his associates.  Not until 1966 did some significant numbers begin 
to challenge the policy as Senator J. William Fulbright, who had managed the 
Gulf of Tonkin Resolution, convened hearings critical of the war.6 
Richard M. Nixon won reelection in a landslide in November 1972.  The 
overwhelming margin of victory reflected misgivings regarding Nixon’s 
opponent, Senator George McGovern, rather than enthusiasm for Nixon or 
many of his policies.7 
In the early 1970s, some in Congress sought to reclaim for Congress some 
portion of the war power which had, over time, flowed to the Executive 
Branch.  Eagleton had emerged as a principal author of the War Powers Bill.  
After introducing Senate Joint Resolution 59 in March 1971,8 Eagleton joined 
forces with Senator Jacob Javits and Senator John Stennis to submit S. 29569 
which the Senate Foreign Relations Committee reported on February 9, 197210 
and which the Senate passed on April 13 of the same year.11  The bill did not 
become law in 1972, but Eagleton and his co-authors reintroduced it as S. 440 
the following year.12 
The Eagleton War Powers Bill sought to curtail the President’s ability to 
commit American troops to non-emergency situations in which conflict was 
likely.13  The act reflected the conclusion that Congress needed to reassert and 
enforce the constitutional limits on the President’s power to go to war and that 
 
 5. Id. 
 6. See, e.g., Supplemental Foreign Assistance Fiscal Year 1966—Vietnam: Hearing on S. 
2793 Before the S. Comm. On Foreign Relations, 89th Cong. (1966). 
 7. STANLEY KELLEY, JR., INTERPRETING ELECTIONS 99–125 (1983). 
 8. 117 CONG. REC. 4379 (1971). 
 9. 118 CONG. REC. 11021, 11027, 11042–53.  (1972). 
 10. Id. at 3316. 
 11. Id at 12610–11. 
 12. 119 CONG. REC. 1339, 1411–13 (1973); see generally THOMAS F. EAGLETON, WAR AND 
PRESIDENTIAL POWER: A CHRONICLE OF CONGRESSIONAL SURRENDER 145 (1974). 
 13. 119 CONG. REC. 1411–13 (1973). 
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the deliberative process the Constitution envisioned as a prerequisite to war 
would produce better results than one which committed it to the President’s 
unilateral choice.  Eagleton said: 
  If we fail to act now after the horrors of Vietnam have so clearly exposed 
the danger of individual war-making, we may never again see the questions of 
war and peace being decided by the sobering and deliberative processes 
inherent in the concept of collective judgment.  14 
Eagleton thought the long-term solution was to adopt his War Powers Act.15  
In the meantime, the more immediate issue during his first years in the Senate 
was how to end the war in Southeast Asia.  During the early months of 1973, 
American involvement in Vietnam wound to a conclusion.  On January 27, 
1973, the parties signed a cease fire agreement in Paris.16  Over the next two 
months, the remaining American troops came home from Vietnam.  Finally, on 
March 29, 1973, Nixon announced that no American troops remained in 
Vietnam and all prisoners of war were on their way home.17 
But the fighting had not ended.  During this period, the United States 
continued to engage in heavy bombing of Cambodia.18  In February 1973, the 
Khmer Rouge had rejected a de facto cease fire to which Cambodia’s Lon Nol 
government had committed.19  The United States responded with massive 
bombing to force Khmer Rouge into compliance.20  For two months after the 
cease fire, the rain of bombs continued.21 
The Nixon administration had justified bombing Cambodia as a means to 
protect American troops in Vietnam.22  The withdrawal of the troops by late 
March 1973 seemingly removed that rationale.  The Nixon administration 
began the task of articulating a new rationale for the bombing.  Assistant 
Secretary of State William Sullivan found support for the bombing in “the 
 
 14. 119 CONG REC. 1413 (1973); see also Thomas F. Eagleton, White House Mythology, 
N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 27, 1973, at 47. 
 15. See generally EAGLETON, supra note 12, at 126–40. 
 16. Agreement on Ending the War and Restoring Peace in Vietnam, Jan. 27, 1973, 24 U.S.T 
1, 935 U.N.T.S. 2. 
 17. Address to the Nation About Vietnam and Domestic Problems, PUB. PAPERS 234 (Mar. 
29, 1973). 
 18. See, e.g., Malcolm W. Brown, Cambodia Bombing is Jointly Planned, N.Y. TIMES, April 
20, 1973, at 4; Pentagon’s Statistics Underscore Intensity of Cambodia Bombing, N.Y. TIMES, 
June 22, 1973, at 2.   
 19. EAGLETON, supra note 12, at 150. 
 20. Id. 
 21. Id. at 109. 
 22. A Conversation with the President About Foreign Policy, PUB. PAPERS 543–52 (July 1, 
1970); Address to the Nation on the Cambodian Sanctuary Operation, PUB. PAPERS 476–77 (June 
3, 1970); Report on the Cambodian Operation, PUB. PAPERS 529 (June 30, 1970). 
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reelection of President Nixon.”23  Secretary of Defense Elliot C. Richardson 
justified it as “the wind-up” and “a kind of residue” of the decade long conflict 
in Vietnam.24 
On March 29, 1973, Eagleton took the Senate floor to challenge as 
unlawful the continued bombing of Cambodia.25  He systematically rebutted 
the legal defenses which the Nixon administration had offered for bombing 
Cambodia.  He pointed out that the Gulf of Tonkin Resolution had been 
repealed in January 1971 and that the SEATO Treaty did not apply since it 
required unanimous agreement of all parties in accordance with their 
constitutional procedure, a condition which had not been fulfilled.  Nixon had 
justified bombing Cambodia as a means to protect American troops: “Now that 
our troops have been totally withdrawn, that rationale for operation in 
Cambodia goes by the board.”26 
Five days later, Eagleton warned that “our Nation continues to suffer the 
consequences of the institutional breakdown that led us into Vietnam.”27  After 
standing “idly by” while the United States “became ever more deeply 
committed to a presidential war,” Congress “unquestioningly gave away our 
most solemn responsibility” in the Gulf of Tonkin Resolution.28  Eagleton 
feared Congress again was “standing on that dangerous threshold.”29  This 
time, however, Nixon would not seek congressional approval but would claim 
he did not need it. 
Eagleton thought Nixon’s actions in Cambodia reflected bad and 
dangerous policy which “might lead to reinvolvement in Southeast Asia.”  
“But the real issue is not whether the President’s Indochina policy is good or 
bad.  The issue is whether the President can legally continue his action without 
the authorization of Congress.”30 
Eagleton restated in more detail the arguments which made clear that 
Nixon lacked legal authority to continue to bomb Cambodia.  Nixon was 
bombing Cambodia not to defend absent American troops but to support the 
Cambodian government: “Whatever the merits of this objective, it cannot be 
pursued on the basis of the Commander in Chief power alone.”31  Eagleton 
warned that Nixon would “continue to act without regard for the powers of 
 
 23. STAFF OF H. COMM. ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS, 97TH CONG., THE WAR POWERS 
RESOLUTION: A SPECIAL STUDY OF THE COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS 107 (Comm. Print 
1982). 
 24. Id. 
 25. 119 CONG. REC. 10188 (1973) (statement of Sen. Eagleton). 
 26. Id. 
 27. Id. at 10678. 
 28. Id. (statement of Sen. Eagleton). 
 29. Id. 
 30. 119 CONG. REC. 10678 (1973) (statement of Sen. Eagleton). 
 31. Id. at 10679. 
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Congress until we move to reassert our own constitutional prerogatives.”32  He 
endorsed the Church-Case legislation to prohibit military activity in Indochina 
absent congressional approval.  He concluded, “Congress can no longer sit idly 
by while the President usurps our responsibilities.  If we are to win back our 
power to declare war, we must begin today by insisting that American military 
activities in Indochina be consistent with the Constitution.”33 
When Secretary of State William Rogers first deferred testifying before the 
Senate Foreign Relations Committee and then claimed scheduling conflicts, 
Eagleton accused the administration of delaying Rogers’s appearance to dodge 
congressional questioning.  Rogers’s position, said Eagleton, was that “it 
would be inconvenient to testify so long as troublesome questions are being 
asked by Congress about the President’s authority to conduct military 
operations over Cambodia.”34 
Eagleton again took the Senate floor on April 17, 1973 to denounce the 
continued bombing of Cambodia and Laos.35  Although Nixon had announced 
in late March that the war was over and the troops were out, Eagleton said, 
“[t]here is a war still going on in Southeast Asia . . . a war with a continuing 
and now escalating American presence.”36  Eagleton pointed out parallels 
between the escalating action against Cambodia and Laos and the way in 
which the United States became involved in Vietnam.  Was American security 
“inseparably entwined” with the survival of the Cambodian regime as we had 
been told it was with a succession of governments in South Vietnam?  Would 
the Cambodian bombing lead to a new military commitment?37 
Eagleton’s concern was not simply with the prospect that Nixon was 
leading America into another presidential war.  He also lamented the sudden 
indifference of the American people: 
  How short our memories.  How still our voices. 
  Gone are the peace rallies; gone are the sacks full of mail; gone are the 
earnest college students walking up and down the hallways of the Senate office 
buildings lobbying Senators to vote for peace. 
  Maybe it[’]s because the draft calls have ended.  Maybe it[’]s a stupifying 
cynicism about the whole governmental process as being incapable of 
responding.  Maybe we are so emotionally drained that we simply no longer 
have the ability to care.  Maybe our national elation at the news of March 30 so 
saturates our thoughts as to preclude a dream-interrupting doubt. 
 
 32. Id. at 10679–80. 
 33. Id. at 10680. 
 34. Id. at 11507. 
 35. 119 CONG. REC. 12724 (1973) (statement of Sen. Eagleton). 
 36. Id. 
 37. Id. 
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  Whatever the cause of our current unconcern it, like our renewed military 
activity in Southeast Asia, is dangerous business.38 
Three weeks after Eagleton’s attack, Rogers finally provided the 
administration’s rationale to the Senate Foreign Relations Committee.39  
Rogers argued that the continued bombing of Cambodia was necessary to 
implement Article 20 of the cease fire agreement which required foreign troops 
to be withdrawn from Cambodia and Laos and obligated all parties to respect 
the sovereignty and security of those nations.  Article 20, Rogers said, was “of 
central importance” since the conflicts in Laos, Cambodia, and Vietnam were 
“so inter-related as to be considered parts of a single conflict.”40  In concluding 
the cease fire agreement, the United States had told the North Vietnamese that 
if they continued hostilities in Cambodia the United States would reciprocate 
to implement Article 20.41  American bombing in Cambodia did not “represent 
a commitment by the United States to the defense of Cambodia” but an 
“interim action” to implement a “critical provision” of the cease fire.42  The 
administration’s reliance on Article 20 was problematic.  Article 20 was 
contained in an executive armistice agreement which was neither a treaty 
ratified by two-thirds of the Senate nor approved by Congress.  Surely the 
President could not enter into an executive agreement and then commit troops 
to war to enforce it.  As John Hart Ely pointed out, “For if the President could 
make an agreement authorizing the use of force without even the concurrence 
of the Senate, and then turn around and implement that agreement, he would 
have become a virtual law unto himself: The bootstrap would be too clearly 
visible.”43  The constitutional validity of an armistice agreement as a basis to 
wage war could be no stronger than that of the war it ended. 
During the early part of 1973, Nixon’s involvement in the Watergate 
cover-up became more apparent.  On April 30, 1973, Nixon announced the 
departures of four close associates—Attorney General Richard Kleindinst, 
Chief of Staff H.R. Haldeman, White House aide John Erlichman, and White 
House counsel John Dean.44  Reflecting these shocking revelations, Nixon’s 
popularity began to plummet.  By May 8, 1973, the Gallup Poll found that 
44.49% thought Nixon knew of the Watergate bugging in advance (compared 
 
 38. 119 CONG. REC. 12724 (1973) (statement of Sen. Eagleton). 
 39. Department Discusses Presidential Authority to Continue U.S. Air Combat Operations 
in Cambodia, 68 DEP’T ST. BULL. 652, 652 (1973) (statement of Secretary of State Rogers). 
 40. Id. 
 41. Id. at 652–53. 
 42. Id. at 654. 
 43. JOHN HART ELY, WAR AND RESPONSIBILITY: CONSTITUTIONAL LESSONS OF VIETNAM 
AND ITS AFTERMATH 35–36 (1993). 
 44. Statement Announcing Resignation of the Attorney General and Members of the White 
House Staff, and Intention to Nominate Elliot C. Richardson to be Attorney General, PUB. 
PAPERS 326 (Apr. 30, 1973). 
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to 34.62% who thought he did not); 53.45% thought he had participated in the 
cover-up.45  By May, Nixon’s approval and disapproval ratings were 
essentially equal and in the low to mid-40% range.46 
The American people also had misgivings over Nixon’s policies in 
Cambodia.  Gallup found on April 24, 1973 that 75.75% thought that “further 
military action in Southeast Asia should require a vote of approval by 
Congress . . . .”47  Fifty-nine percent thought the bombings in Cambodia and 
Laos would result in troops being sent to Southeast Asia.48  And 56.92% 
disapproved of American planes bombing Cambodia and Laos while only 
28.64% approved.49 
II.  THE EAGLETON AMENDMENT 
In order to finance the bombing, the administration in early 1973 asked 
Congress to increase by roughly $500 million the Pentagon’s authority to 
transfer money between accounts as part of a supplemental appropriation 
request.50  Such requests are routine measures to allow federal agencies to meet 
shortfalls caused when unforeseen expenditures produce shortfalls.  That 
requested amount could finance the Cambodia bombing and the administration 
would cite its authorization as congressional support for the activity.51 
In early May 1973, Secretary of Defense Elliot Richardson testified before 
the Senate Appropriations Committee of which Eagleton was a new member.52  
Under questioning Richardson said that Nixon could continue bombing 
Cambodia even without congressional approval of the transfer authority.  
Richardson did not rely on Article 20 to provide legal authority for Nixon to 
bomb.  Instead, he insisted that Nixon had the same authority to bomb 
Cambodia that he had before the cease fire agreement was signed on January 
27, 1973 because the cease fire agreement did not terminate his authority.53 
On May 10, 1973, the House of Representatives cast two votes to limit 
Nixon’s ability to bomb Cambodia.54  By a vote of 219 to 188, the House 
deleted the nearly $500 million in additional transfer authority for the 
Department of Defense.55  And by 224 to 172, the House amended the 
supplemental appropriations bill to prohibit the use of any funds the bill 
 
 45. Gallup Poll No. 871 (May 08, 1973). 
 46. Id. 
 47. Gallup Poll No. 869 (April 24, 1973). 
 48. Id. 
 49. Id. 
 50. See EAGLETON, supra note 12, at 155–56. 
 51. Id. at 156. 
 52. Id. at 157. 
 53. Id. at 157–58. 
 54. 119 CONG. REC. 15317–23 (1973). 
 55. Id. at 15317–18. 
SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW 
2007] ASSUMING RESPONSIBILITY 159 
provided for combat in Cambodia.56  Nonetheless, the House measure left a 
significant loophole.  It put off limits only the funds covered therein.  It did not 
restrict funds previously appropriated.  The administration had taken the 
position that it could and would divert funds previously appropriated for other 
defense purposes to fund the bombing of Cambodia.  The House legislation 
accordingly offered its members an opportunity to vote against the bombing of 
Cambodia without actually stopping it. 
That was not the sort of formula which appealed to Thomas F. Eagleton.  
Eagleton saw that the House legislation would fail to stop the bombing of 
Cambodia because Nixon would divert other resources to that effort.57  
Accordingly, Eagleton wrote on his yellow legal pad the seven words “or 
heretofore appropriated under any other act” to close that loophole.58  Eagleton 
offered that language as an amendment to the House bill when the Senate 
Appropriations Committee met on May 15, 1973 to address the second 
supplemental appropriations which the House had passed.59  The Senate 
Appropriations Committee voted 24 to 0 in favor of the Eagleton Amendment 
to cut off all funds for bombing in Cambodia.60  The surprising vote made front 
page news in part because it was unanimous and included a number of 
Republican conservatives,61 some of whom were concerned that the bombing 
runs could result in American pilots taken prisoner and a subsequent escalation 
of the war.62  The action of the Appropriations Committee in adopting the 
Eagleton Amendment constituted “a shout of defiance that shook a White 
House determined to continue with the bombing of Cambodia.”63  The next 
day Nixon issued a statement expressing concern that Congress had “taken 
action that could severely undermine prospects for success.”64 
At the same time, Senators Case and Church had offered an amendment to 
the State Department authorization bill to bar use of funds to finance American 
military involvement in, over, or from off shores of North Vietnam, South 
Vietnam, Laos, or Cambodia without specific congressional authorization.65  
Case-Church was broader than the Eagleton Amendment since it applied 
 
 56. Id. at 15323. 
 57. Eagleton was not alone in recognizing this hole in the House bill.  See, e.g., id. at 15435 
(statement of Sen. Brooke); id. at 15436 (statement of Sen. Case). 
 58. EAGLETON, supra note 12, at 160. 
 59. S. REP. NO. 93-160, at 133 (1973). 
 60. 119 CONG. REC. 17103 (1973) (statement of Sen. McClellan). 
 61. John W. Finney, Senate Panel Votes, 24-0, To Bar Cambodian Raids, N.Y. TIMES, May 
16, 1973, at 1. 
 62. Interview with J. Brian Atwood (July 13, 2007). 
 63. John W. Finney, A Shout of Defiance in The Senate, N.Y. TIMES, May 20, 1973, at 208. 
 64. White House Statement About Congressional Role in Indochina Peace Efforts,  PUB. 
PAPERS 537 (May 16, 1973). 
 65. 119 CONG. REC. 15436–37 (1973) (statements of Sens. Case and Church). 
SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW 
160 SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 52:151 
throughout Southeast Asia.66  It was not, however, on as fast a legislative track 
as the Eagleton Amendment. 
The Senate considered the Eagleton Amendment as part of the 
supplemental appropriations bill on May 29, 1973.67  When the Appropriations 
Committee had unanimously approved the Eagleton Amendment, Senator 
Roman Hruska had been among the 24 votes in favor.68  He now argued, by 
point of order, that the Eagleton Amendment violated Rule XVI of the Senate’s 
Standing Rules in that it sought to limit not simply the funds in the subject bill 
but funds “heretofore appropriated under any other act.”69 
Eagleton led the successful fight to defeat Hruska’s point of order.  He 
presented his Amendment as a test of the operation of the American system of 
government.70  Congress had a “historic opportunity to show that the system 
can end, once and for all, what the system should never have allowed to 
begin.”71  The vote also presented an occasion for members of Congress to 
accept and act upon their constitutional responsibility.  Eagleton implored his 
colleagues: 
  We can no longer hide behind the Presidency.  We can no longer put off 
our responsibilities to await the latest word from Paris.  And we can no longer 
rationalize that our individual vote—even though only one of 535—is 
unimportant.  Now, because we have made the American people aware of the 
role Congress must play within our Government system, we will be held 
individually and collectively accountable for the action we take.72 
Failure “to perform our constitutional duty” would undermine the American 
system of law.73 
Eagleton anticipated, and derided, the argument that his Amendment 
would embarrass Nixon’s and Kissinger’s negotiating ability.  The American 
people no longer wanted American troops to be used in combat in Indochina.  
Moreover, the administration’s argument rested on a false premise. 
  Adversary positions in diplomatic negotiations are constructed from a 
blend of real strength and bluff.  But how much bluff can be left on either side 
after 5 years of negotiations between the United States and North Vietnam? 
  It is no secret that the American people want to get out of Indochina—that 
is why we began the negotiations 5 years ago.74 
 
 66. Compare id. (statements of Sens. Case and Church) with id. at 17103 (statement of Sen. 
McClellan) (noting the geographical area covered by the Eagleton Amendment). 
 67. Id. at 17103 (statement of Sen. McClellan). 
 68. Id. at 17125-26 (statements of Sens. Symington and Hruska). 
 69. Id. at 17124. 
 70. See 119 CONG. REC.17128–29 (1973) (statement of Sen. Eagleton). 
 71. Id. at 17128. 
 72. Id. at 17129. 
 73. Id. 
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Finally, Eagleton addressed the human costs of the war.  In the few months 
since the cease fire agreement was signed, the United States had dropped more 
than 146,000 tons of bombs on Cambodia and Laos.75  Ten Americans had 
died; two were missing.  “And we must also consider the people of Cambodia 
and Laos—people who have suffered even greater losses.”76  The bombing had 
also “created a serious problem for the living” with millions of Cambodians 
now refugees.  The bombing would impose “devastation” on Cambodia which 
would be felt “for a decade.”77  “Are our goals in Indochina worth this pain 
and tragedy?  Is it worth the risk that the list of MIA’s will increase?  Or that 
another American will be captured and held as a prisoner of war?”78 
In closing, Eagleton again exhorted the Senate to assert Congress’s 
constitutional role: 
  The American people are now more aware than they have been for 30 
years of the awesome responsibilities assigned to Congress by the 
Constitution.  If we base our vote today on a desire to defer our judgment to 
the President, then we will deal a heavy blow to the institutions of government 
devised by the Founding Fathers. 
  It is time to answer the hard questions for the American people.  Either we 
vote to stop the war or we vote to grant the President our authority to continue 
to wage war in Indochina.79 
The Senate voted 55 to 21 that the Eagleton Amendment was germane to the 
language the House of Representatives had passed.80 
On May 31, 1973, Eagleton led a successful effort to defeat amendments 
offered by Senator Robert Taft81 and Senator Bob Dole,82 which would have 
eviscerated his Amendment.  After Dole delivered an impassioned plea that the 
Eagleton Amendment would undermine efforts to gain accounting of American 
prisoners of war and those missing in action,83 Eagleton replied that the issue 
before the Senate was rather whether the bombing of Cambodia was “legal or 
wise.”84 
 
 74. Id. 
 75. 119 CONG. REC. 17130 (1973) (statement of Sen. Eagleton). 
 76. Id. 
 77. Id. 
 78. Id. 
 79. Id. 
 80. 119 CONG. REC. 17140 (1973). 
 81. The Taft Amendment would have created an exception to the Eagleton Amendment to 
allow bombing of Cambodia and Laos against North Vietnamese forces.  It was defeated 63 to 17.  
Id. at 17663; see EAGLETON, supra note 12, at 164–65. 
 82. The Dole Amendment was defeated 56 to 25.  119 CONG. REC. 17687 (1973). 
 83. Id. at 17669 (statement of Sen. Dole). 
 84. Id. at 17680 (statement of Sen. Eagleton). 
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The vote later that day in favor of Eagleton’s Amendment was almost anti-
climatic.  It carried 63 to 19.85  The significance of the vote was unmistakable.  
It constituted the first time the House or Senate had voted for an absolute cut 
off of funding for combat activities in Southeast Asia.86  The margin of more 
than three to one represented a strong statement of Senate opposition to 
Nixon’s bombing. 
The House and Senate bills then went to a conference.87  The House 
conferees included a sizeable delegation of Vietnam hawks who were opposed 
to the Eagleton Amendment.88  Although the House conferees did not adopt the 
Eagleton Amendment they allowed the full House to decide between the 
original House position and the more stringent Eagleton Amendment.89  On 
June 25, 1973, the House twice defeated efforts to weaken the Eagleton 
Amendment.90  First, it adopted the Eagleton Amendment in preference to its 
own legislation, 235 to 172.91  Representative George Mahon then offered an 
amendment to defer the effective date of the Eagleton Amendment for sixty 
days, until September 1, 1973.92  Mahon’s Amendment failed on a 204 to 204 
vote.93  The House then approved the measure, including the Eagleton 
Amendment, by a voice vote.94  The Senate approved the conference report on 
H.R. 7447 on June 26, 1973 by a vote of 81 to 11.95  The supplemental 
appropriations with the Eagleton Amendment now was presented to Nixon for 
his consideration.96 
Nixon wasted no time responding.  He vetoed the bill the very next 
morning.97  He did not pull any punches in stating his objections.  Nixon 
expressed his “grave concern” that the Eagleton Amendment would “cripple or 
destroy the chances for an effective negotiated settlement in Cambodia and the 
 
 85. Id. at 17692. 
 86. Richard L. Madden, House Must Act: Its Version Is Milder—Delay in Sending Bill to 
Nixon Seen, N.Y. TIMES, June 1, 1973, at 1. 
 87. EAGLETON, supra note 12, at 168. 
 88. Id. at 169. 
 89. Id. 
 90. Id. at 172. 
 91. 119 CONG. REC. 21173 (1973).   
 92. Id.; EAGLETON, supra note 12, at 172. 
 93. 119 CONG. REC. 21179 (1973); Richard L. Madden, House Approves Cutoff of Funds to 
Bomb Cambodia, N.Y. TIMES, June 26, 1973, at 1, 6.  At one point, Mahon’s Amendment held a 
205 to 204 margin until Representative Gunn McKay, D.-Utah, withdrew his vote for Mahon’s 
Amendment to pair with an absent colleague who opposed it.  Madden, supra, at 6.  Speaker 
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 94. Madden, supra note 93, at 1. 
 95. 119 CONG. REC. 21544 (1973). 
 96. EAGLETON, supra note 12, at 172. 
 97. Id. at 173. 
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withdrawal of all North Vietnamese troops . . . .”98  A total cessation of 
bombing in Cambodia would “virtually remove Communist incentive to 
negotiate and would thus seriously undercut ongoing diplomatic efforts to 
achieve a ceasefire in Cambodia.”99  It would make a Communist victory more 
likely in Cambodia thereby undermining “the fragile balance” in Southeast 
Asia.100  And it “would call into question our national commitment,” causing a 
“serious blow to America’s international credibility.”101  If a Supplemental 
Appropriation was not passed, nine government agencies, including the Social 
Security Administration, would be unable to pay their employees.102  But a 
“greater disservice” would be to enact the Eagleton Amendment which would 
jeopardize Nixon’s efforts “to create a stable, enduring structure of peace 
around the world.”103 
Legislative efforts to end the Cambodian bombing continued on other 
fronts.  The House proceeded to consider a continuing resolution to permit 
federal departments to operate in the new fiscal year at their present 
appropriations pending congressional approval of appropriations for the new 
year.104  On June 26, 1973, the House had added the Eagleton Amendment, 
240 to 172, to the continuing resolution, which would allow government 
agencies to operate during the fiscal year about to begin.105 
The following day, Eagleton offered his Amendment to pending legislation 
to raise the debt ceiling of $465 billion, which would expire on June 30, 
1973.106  He encouraged his colleagues to “persist in this endeavor to bring this 
unconstitutional and unauthorized war to a termination.”  He pointed out that 
Americans were being killed in Cambodia and Laos and that American 
bombers had dropped more tonnage on Cambodia in the five months since the 
cease fire was signed than was dropped on North Vietnam the prior three 
years.  Nixon clearly wished “to continue a bombing policy which is 
improvident, unwise, and goes directly to the heart of the constitutional 
process.  It is our authority—Congress’ authority—to determine how, when, 
and where we go to war . . . . ,” said Eagleton.  If Nixon persisted in his 
 
 98. Veto of the Supplemental Appropriations Bill Containing a Restriction on United States 
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 103. Veto of the Supplemental Appropriations Bill Containing a Restriction on United States 
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“methodology” Congress must persist, too.  To delete the Eagleton 
Amendment would be tantamount to sanctioning the war in Cambodia.107 
There was limited debate.  Senator Pete Domenici, who had previously 
supported the Eagleton Amendment, argued against it now, saying it was 
“inappropriate” to attach it to the debt ceiling legislation to which it was not 
“relevant.”108  Eagleton responded that inasmuch as the Cambodian bombing 
was expensive it contributed to the need to raise the debt ceiling.109  Senator 
George McGovern commended Eagleton for offering “an eminently sensible 
proposal” and thought “[w]e should make one more effort in the Senate to put 
an end to this senseless bombing of Cambodia and Laos.”110  Since senators 
had made clear by overwhelming votes their opposition to the bombing, 
McGovern declared, “this is Nixon’s war.  This is a Presidential war being 
conducted in clear defiance of the overwhelming expression of opinion of the 
Members of the Congress of the United States.”111  But Senator John Tower 
argued that though Nixon had not started the war, he had ended it.112  
Eagleton’s Amendment “is calculated to perpetuate the war in Southeast 
Asia.”113  The war was “Congress’ war.”114  And Senator Strom Thurmond 
urged his colleagues to give Nixon “a little elbow room in which to 
negotiate.”115  Eagleton’s bill was playing politics and would result “in great 
detriment to the welfare of the Nation.”116 
In reply, Eagleton agreed that the war in Cambodia was “Nixon’s war” 
since it was “being waged by the President without the authority of 
Congress.”117  Eagleton implored the Senate “to do everything in our power so 
that our voices and pleas will be heeded.”118 
Although it may have sounded at the time as if Senators McGovern and 
Eagleton were traveling a common path, in retrospect the different 
formulations they used may have foreshadowed their different approaches 
which became evident forty-eight hours later.  Whereas McGovern thought 
“[w]e should make one more effort in the Senate”119 to end the bombing, 
Eagleton implored his colleagues “to do everything in our power so that our 
 
 107. 119 CONG. REC. 21659 (1973) (statement of Sen. Eagleton). 
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voices and pleas will be heeded.”120  Whereas McGovern concluded that “from 
here on out, this is Nixon’s war” because it was conducted “in clear defiance of 
the overwhelming expression of opinion of the Members of the 
Congress . . . ,”121 Eagleton viewed it as Nixon’s war because it was being 
waged without congressional authorization.122  Whereas McGovern suggested 
Congress had discharged its duty by the overwhelming votes,123 Eagleton 
argued that “[w]e exercise that responsibility in a reasonable manner in cutting 
off funds for Cambodia.”124  In any event, the Eagleton Amendment carried, 67 
to 29.125  Only seven Democrats voted against it; twenty Republicans voted for 
it.126 
On June 27, 1973, the House voted 241 to 173 to override Nixon’s veto of 
the supplemental request.127  Although the House vote was an impressive 
showing, it fell 35 votes short of the two-thirds supermajority the Constitution 
required to override Nixon’s veto.128 
At this point White House counselor and former Representative and 
Secretary of Defense Melvin Laird on Nixon’s behalf began to seek a 
compromise with Congress.129  Laird’s effort was novel.  “That was another 
first—the executive branch was actively bargaining with Congress over its 
right to continue a war that had never been authorized,” Eagleton later 
wrote.130  On June 28, 1973, Laird advised House leaders that Nixon would 
sign legislation which deferred the cutoff to August 15, 1973.131  The same day 
Rogers met in closed session with the Senate Foreign Relations Committee; 
following the meeting, Rogers and Fulbright both seemed receptive to a 
compromise.132 
III.  THE JUNE 29, 1973 SENATE DEBATE 
On June 29, 1973, the curtain lifted for the final act.  On that day, the 
Senate proceeded to consider H. J. Res. 636, the continuing resolution which 
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the House had passed for fiscal year 1974.133  That morning, the Senate 
Foreign Relations Committee had voted 15 to 2 to support a compromise 
between the Nixon White House and Senator J. William Fulbright and some 
other Senate opponents of the bombing134 which would prohibit use of 
appropriated funds to “finance the involvement of United States military forces 
in hostilities” in, over, or off the shore of Indochina on and after August 15, 
1973.135  The Fulbright Compromise deferred the cutoff for six weeks.136  It 
also extended the ban to all of Southeast Asia, not simply Cambodia and 
Laos.137  Only Senate Majority Leader Mike Mansfield and Senator Edmund S. 
Muskie opposed it in Committee.138 
The June 29, 1973 debate on the Eagleton Amendment and Fulbright 
Compromise, in many respects, showed the Senate at its finest.  Eagleton later 
called the debate “the best” he had participated in during his first four years in 
the Senate.139  Hubert Humphrey called the debate “the Senate’s finest 
hour.”140  Indeed, thirty Senators participated in a discussion that explored the 
Eagleton Amendment and Fulbright Compromise from a variety of angles.141  
Senators spoke with passion and engaged each other, on and off the floor, and 
frequent allies found themselves on opposite sides of the question.142 
In presenting the Compromise, Senator Fulbright argued that the 
“executive and legislative branches will, at last, act in a coordinate manner to 
bring to a close this tragic episode in our Nation’s history.”143  Fulbright 
insisted that the August 15 cutoff should not be construed as recognition of 
Nixon’s authority to continue military action in the interim: “The view of most 
members of the committee has been and continues to be that the President does 
not have such authority” absent “specific congressional approval.”144  
Although most members would have preferred the Eagleton Amendment, 
refusal to compromise with Nixon “might precipitate a serious confrontation 
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between the two branches of government which would result in severe 
hardships for many.”145  The Committee felt compelled to do all it could “to 
avoid such a confrontation, provided a compromise could be found which 
would reaffirm the proper constitutional role of the Congress with regard to the 
warmaking power and which would specify a date certain for” an end to 
United States military involvement in Indochina.146 
Fulbright reported that the Committee had received assurances that the 
bombing of Cambodia would not be escalated during the interim.147  The 
important facts were “that the war will end, that a proper constitutional balance 
will have been restored, and that a new era of national unity and positive 
accomplishment will now be possible.”148 
Others echoed Fulbright’s characterization.  Senator Hugh Scott, the 
minority leader, said the Compromise was in the national interest.149  Senators 
had given up their desire that the bombing end immediately, but the Executive 
had accepted a deadline which hampered its negotiating stance.  Scott would 
remind those who would complain that the Compromise “does continue the 
right to [bomb Cambodia]” until August 15 “that the right would have 
continued for a much longer time had the Executive prevailed.”150  Senator 
Jacob Javits, who had supported the Fulbright Compromise in the Foreign 
Relations Committee, approached the agreement with a “heavy” heart but 
thought it necessary to save lives, avoid “a domestic unconstitutional 
confrontation,” and avoid a worsening of the bad atmosphere in the country.151  
Senator George McGovern praised the Compromise as a “tactical effort to get 
the best possible veto-proof solution.”152  Moreover, it did not preclude 
Congress from attaching provisions requiring an immediate cutoff to other 
legislation.153 
The congratulatory tenor of the discussion changed when Fulbright yielded 
to Eagleton for a question.154  Eagleton proceeded to expose the 
inconsistencies in Fulbright’s position in the following colloquy: 
  Mr. EAGLETON. . . .  I want to inquire as to what this resolution includes. 
What does it prevent within the next 45 days?  Does it permit continued 
bombing between now and August 15? 
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  Mr. FULBRIGHT.  As I have said, I do not regard him as having the right 
to this.  He has the power to do it.  And unless we have something like this, the 
only sanction we have here is to impeach him.  And I do not think that is 
practical.  I do not recommend it.  I know of no other alternative. 
  Mr. EAGLETON.  In the light of the legislative history, meaning the 
statement of former Secretary of Defense Richardson that we will continue the 
bombing unless the funds are cut off, will we with the adoption of this 
resolution permit the bombing of Cambodia for the next 45 days?  That is the 
question I pose to the Senator from Arkansas. 
  Mr. FULBRIGHT.  Until August 15. 
  Mr. EAGLETON.  Would it permit the bombing of Laos? 
  Mr. FULBRIGHT.  It would not prevent it. 
  Mr. EAGLETON.  Would it permit the bombing of North and South 
Vietnam until August 15? 
  Mr. FULBRIGHT.  I do not think it is legal or constitutional.  But whether 
it is right to do it or not, he has done it.  He has the power to do it because 
under our system there is not any easy way to stop him. 
  I do not want my statement to be taken to mean that I approve of it or think 
that it is constitutional or legal for him to do it.  He can do it.  He had done it.  
Do I make myself clear? 
  Mr. EAGLETON.  In a way yes, and in a way no.  If we adopt this 
resolution, the President will continue to bomb Cambodia.  That means quite 
simply that we will sanction it, does it not? 
  Mr. FULBRIGHT.  We do not sanction it.  It does not mean that we 
approve of the bombing.  This is the best way to stop it.  I have never approved 
of it.  And I do not wish my answer to indicate that I approve of the bombing, 
because I do not. 
  Mr. EAGLETON.  But the President will exercise a power to bomb in 
Indochina within the next 45 days, is that correct?  A power that will now be 
sanctioned by our action? 
  Mr. FULBRIGHT.  The President has the power to do a lot of things of 
which I do not approve. 
  Mr. EAGLETON.  He will exercise that power, and whether he exercises 
that power wisely, we know that within the next 45 days he will exercise a 
right to bomb Cambodia—a right given him by the Congress of the United 
States. 
  Mr. FULBRIGHT.  I do not consider that he has the right to do it.  But 
because we are unable to muster the votes, this is a compromise that would 
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stop it.  This is the time we have had a majority of both Houses take any action 
to prohibit bombing. 
  Mr. EAGLETON.  But he would now have the power by our action.  
Would he also have the power to bomb Laos? 
  Mr. FULBRIGHT.  As he viewed it, yes.  And he would exercise the 
power. 
  Mr. EAGLETON.  He would have the power as he viewed it to bomb 
North Vietnam and South Vietnam. 
  Mr. FULBRIGHT.  The Senator is correct.155 
Those supporting the Fulbright Compromise made several points.  They 
argued that the August 15, 1973 cutoff was the best resolution opponents of the 
bombing could get.156  Absent the agreement, Nixon would veto the Eagleton 
Amendment, thereby shutting down certain government agencies at hardship to 
government employees and those they serve.157  Since the House would not 
override Nixon’s veto, Nixon might continue the bombing indefinitely absent 
this agreement.158  The August 15, 1973 Compromise did not constitute 
approval of the bombing.159  It was “the only possible way out of a nearly 
impossible situation.”160  Congress could adopt the Fulbright Compromise 
calling for the end of bombing on August 15, 1973 and, after Nixon signed the 
bill into law, pass the Eagleton Amendment terminating the bombing 
sooner.161 
Senator Frank Church, a long-time foe of the Vietnam War and an 
architect of the Fulbright Compromise found “repugnant” the implication that 
the proponents of the Compromise “are somehow relegated to the ranks of the 
impure, while those who oppose it somehow stand on the side of 
conscience.”162  Past legislative proposals which imposed deadlines were not 
viewed as endorsements of the war; why should this one be so viewed?  The 
war in Cambodia is an “abomination,” “unconstitutional,” “illegal,” 
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“immoral,” and “idiotic.”163  But the issue involved “a stark and simple matter 
of how we bring this awful war to an end.”164  Congress could not stop the war 
without overriding Nixon’s veto and it lacked the votes to achieve that 
result.165  If Congress passed the Eagleton Amendment again, Nixon would not 
“cave in” and sign it.166  The Fulbright Compromise was not a “cave-in.”167  
The alternative course would be “a futile debate, flouting our impotence, and 
allowing this war in Cambodia to continue indefinitely.”168 
Eagleton responded that no one questioned the motives or integrity of the 
architects of the Fulbright Compromise.169  The debate turned on 
“philosophy.”170  Eagleton then addressed Church’s argument that supporting a 
deadline had never before been seen as supporting the war.171  Referring to the 
previous “end-the-war” efforts, Eagleton argued that “there is a big difference 
between now and the time that some of those were offered several years 
ago.”172  Then, half a million American troops were in Vietnam.  Time limits 
were included in proposed withdrawal legislation to allow for their removal in 
a safe manner.  Now that the troops were home, an extended time limit could 
have no such justification.  Its necessary effect was to put Congress’s sanction 
on the bombing.  Instead of emphasizing that Nixon “will not be cowed” as 
Church had done, “we must ask ourselves whether we will be cowed.”  
Nixon’s veto threat could not “whiplash . . . [Congress] into conforming to his 
desire.”  Congress was “caving in when we think of a veto.”173 
One of the Senate’s most eloquent orators, Senator John Pastore rose to 
defend the Fulbright Compromise.  He would not disagree with anything 
Eagleton had said or the logic implicit in his position that “if it is immoral to 
kill after August 15, surely it is immoral to kill now.”  But “is it not better to 
go about it in a realistic and practical way” and act to “stop this immorality 
after August 15.”  The question was not “who is cowed by whom or who is 
retreating from whom” but what was the most practical way to end the 
bombing.  The only alternative to the Fulbright Compromise was that Nixon 
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would continue bombing indefinitely “unless we tie up the mechanism of 
government.”174  The Senate was faced with a choice of two evils.175 
Eagleton raised four points in response.176  First, he reminded his 
colleagues of the impact of forty-five days of additional bombing in 
Cambodia.177  Cambodian lives would be lost and the country subjected to 
“havoc.”178  Moreover, if an American pilot was shot down the administration 
would ask Congress to extend authority to continue bombing and “we will find 
ourselves locked in the deadly embrace of yet another war—this time in 
Cambodia.”179 
Second, compromise and accommodating, though generally appropriate 
legislative activities, were not proper in this context where constitutional issues 
were implicated.  As Eagleton noted, “But the continued bombing of 
Cambodia is not an issue that yields to compromise.  Congress cannot sanction 
an unconstitutional and illegal endeavor for ‘just a little while.’  There is no 
way of being just a little bit unconstitutional, or just a little bit illegal.”180 
Third, he raised an institutional argument.  Senators could not evade 
decision and responsibility by punting to the White House.  They must accept 
personal responsibility, a refrain Eagleton had sounded in his April 3, 1973 and 
May 29, 1973 speeches.181 
  We have created a legend around the tough, lonely decisions that are made 
by the one man who occupies the oval office.  But today each of us is faced 
with a decision that could mean life or death for American pilots or 
Cambodian citizens.  Each of us must agonize over the burden of our own 
office—we must agonize over the great responsibility assigned to the 
legislative branch by the Constitution.182 
Congress must reassert its constitutional responsibility.  It had a duty to pass 
“vital appropriations bills,” but it also had a “solemn duty to decide how, when 
and where our Nation goes to war.”  Congress exercised that duty by attaching 
a cutoff amendment.  If Nixon vetoed such an appropriation, “he must accept 
the full responsibility for the consequences of that action.”  Congress “should 
not be bludgeoned into giving legitimacy to President Nixon’s illegal 
Cambodian war.”  Congress acted appropriately in sending Nixon the 
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continuing resolution with the Eagleton Amendment.  If Nixon chose to veto it, 
“the choice is his.”183 
Finally, Eagleton raised a practical argument.  If Congress stood its ground 
and passed the continuing resolution with the Eagleton Amendment, Nixon 
would ultimately sign it rather than bring the government to a halt.184  Eagleton 
did not believe Nixon would decide that bombing Cambodia for another forty-
five days was “more precious to him than continuing the functioning of the 
U.S. Government.”185 
Although Eagleton led the fight against the August 15 Compromise, others 
joined in raising these points.  Majority leader Mike Mansfield, for instance, 
implored his colleagues to assert their institutional role, even at the risk of 
provoking a constitutional confrontation: 
  The warmaking power is that of Congress exclusively, and the war in 
Cambodia does not have a shred of validity attached to it.  It is illegal, it is 
unconstitutional, it is immoral. 
  Why should we be afraid of a confrontation with the executive branch of 
this Government?  Why do we have to cave in so as to avoid the possibility of 
being unable to override a veto?  Why can we not face up to our 
responsibilities under the Constitution?186 
The bombing had cost, and would cost, the lives and freedom of American 
soldiers.  Moreover, America had dropped more than 200,000 tons of bombs 
on Cambodia in five months “on a poor, hapless people living in a nation 
where the majority of the inhabitants desire nothing more than to be let 
alone.”187  The United States was denying the Cambodian people the right to 
determine their own destiny.188 
Senator Mark Hatfield derided the arguments of those who defended the 
Fulbright Compromise as a legitimate legislative compromise: 
  There are times and there are issues when one can never compromise. 
  One does not compromise about the constitutional responsibilities of this 
body. 
  One does not compromise about law. 
  One does not compromise about the slaughter of innocents.189 
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Senator Edward M. Kennedy reminded his colleagues that “millions of 
innocent” people had “endured the brutal onslaught of death and destruction 
rained down on their homes and villages and countryside” by American 
bombers.190  The Fulbright Compromise would “go down in infamy in 
American history.”191  It was a “cruel and calculated pact” to “ratify the 
unconscionable and unconstitutional warmaking” Nixon was conducting.  The 
senators should not grant Nixon an “amnesty for the slaughter of the past, and 
a license for 6 more weeks of slaughter in Cambodia.”  If the Senate accepted 
the Fulbright Compromise, the Cambodian blood shed during the next six 
weeks would stain its hands.  The only purpose of the Compromise was “to 
save some shred of [Nixon’s] tattered prestige.”192  The Cambodian people 
should not bear that price.193 
Senator Edmund Muskie did not see confronting Nixon as problematic.  
Tension and conflict between the two political branches would cause “the 
foundations of government . . . to shake.”194  But that was how government 
was supposed to work: 
  When the President, and we in Congress, are at odds about our respective 
constitutional roles, should we timidly ask him to return what is ours and 
expect him to give it back without a fight? 
  It is in the nature of such tensions and such conflicts that we have to stand 
up and he has to stand up, until somehow something gives. 
Congress had not “tried hard enough” to assert its prerogatives.195 
Similarly, Senator Charles Mathias argued that Congress seemed unwilling 
“to bear the burden of the responsibility for exercising the power that is 
entrusted to us.”196  Congress’s ability to exercise its constitutional “power of 
war and peace” was “only as strong as our will to employ it.”197 
Senator Walter F. Mondale pointed out a fallacy in the argument that the 
Fulbright Compromise was the only way to end the bombing since Congress 
lacked the votes to override Nixon’s veto.198  Congress’s power to end the war 
immediately did not turn on whether it could override a veto.  Congress could 
simply refuse to pass the continuing resolution or it could refuse to extend the 
debt ceiling.199  Such inaction could not, of course, be presented to the 
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President for approval or veto.  Either course would deprive Nixon of the 
resources to prosecute the war.200 
Mondale’s point struck Senator Pastore as “simplifying the 
unsimplifiable.”201  It was easy to say Congress could “bring the Government 
to a halt.”  But what would then become of “thousands and thousands of 
paraplegics and veterans of Vietnam” who were dependent on government 
services for their most basic needs?  If Congress stopped “the mechanisms of 
government” the “injury and the irreparable harm will be untold, and it will 
remain on our souls.”  Senator Pastore concluded his statement: 
I repeat, Senator Eagleton, you are absolutely right.  I do not question you one 
bit.  But they have forced us into a corner.  We are into a corner.  The decision 
we have to make tonight is not a decision on what is right or what is wrong, 
but a decision on what is the best course to follow as between two evils—and I 
am suggesting that the lesser of the two evils is to compromise.202 
Eagleton did not agree.  Congress had “let ourselves be forced into this 
corner.  After one veto, we have taken a ‘powder.’  We have forfeited our role 
within our system.”  Eagleton repeated his belief that Nixon would not again 
veto the Eagleton Amendment if it meant shutting down the government.203 
Some other liberal senators did not agree.  Senator George McGovern, for 
instance, argued that the vote raised no “question of principle” but simply one 
“of which strategy will achieve the result we seek.”204  McGovern regarded the 
Fulbright Compromise as a “great victory.”205  Far from being “a capitulation 
for the Senate” it was “the culmination of years of effort” by members of 
Congress.206 
Senator Hubert Humphrey, too, supported the Fulbright Compromise.  He 
thought “what we need is not a test of will in this body, but a test of 
judgment.”207  The Fulbright Compromise was the best way to end the 
bombing under the circumstances.  “We are here to help govern a country, not 
merely to prove a point, or confront a President.”208 
A number of senators, including George McGovern and Stuart Symington, 
suggested that the Congress could pass the Fulbright Compromise and, once 
Nixon signed it, adopt the Eagleton Amendment, thereby ending the 
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bombing.209  Others pointed out that argument was empty rhetoric.210  As a 
practical matter, the vote on the Fulbright Compromise was the “end of the 
fight.”211 
By a vote of 64 to 26, the Senate voted in favor of the Fulbright 
Compromise.212  Those supporting the motion included the Senate’s 
conservative members as well as some leading doves—Fulbright, Church, 
Case, Humphrey, McGovern, Gaylord, Nelson, and Symington.213  Those 
opposed included nineteen Democrats (e.g., Birch, Bayh, Philip Hart, 
Kennedy, Mansfield, Mondale, Muskie, and, of course, Eagleton).214  The 
Senate then voted, 58 to 31, to delete the Eagleton Amendment.215  The vote 
generally tracked the prior one except that a few doves—McGovern, Nelson, 
Claiborne Pell, Symington, and William Proxmire—switched sides.216 
In short order both houses passed the continuing resolution with the 
Fulbright Compromise.  After deleting the Eagleton Amendment, they also 
passed legislation to extend the debt ceiling.217  The front page banner headline 
of the June 30, 1973 New York Times proclaimed “Nixon Agrees to Stop 
Bombing By U.S. in Cambodia By Aug. 15, With New Raids Up to 
Congress.”218  The following day a reporter wrote that it had been a “case of an 
eyeball to eyeball confrontation in which both sides blinked.”219  And the 
Times praised Congress for using its power of the purse “with extraordinary 
determination” to extract concessions which “substantially restore[d] its eroded 
constitutional role in the war-making process.”220  The Washington Post 
viewed the episode as a triumph for Congress.221  Nixon signed the legislation 
on July 1, 1973.222 
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Contrary to his assurances, Nixon escalated the bombing.  On August 3, 
1973 Nixon promised to obey the August 15 cutoff, but blamed Congress for 
undermining the enemy’s incentive to negotiate.223 
IV.  EAGLETON’S ROLE ASSESSED 
Eagleton’s contribution exemplified legislating at its finest.  Rather than 
contenting himself with the symbolic but ineffective approach the House had 
taken, Eagleton set out to design legislation that would not simply express 
sentiment against the bombing but would also confine presidential discretion.  
He identified the problem with the House approach and drafted the remedy.  
Having done so, he steered it through the parliamentary minefields, 
overcoming a point of order with a showing of germaneness.  Moreover, he 
placed the Amendment where it would receive fast track attention.  Eagleton’s 
actions raised the stakes for all involved.  It confronted Nixon with the specter 
of a real and effective cutoff of funds.  This prospect forced Nixon, for the first 
time, to bargain with Congress.  Once Eagleton placed his Amendment on the 
continuing resolution and debt ceiling legislation, it also raised the stakes for 
Congress.  Eagleton’s Amendment forced Congress either to take 
responsibility for ending the bombing immediately or run the risk that a veto 
might upset constituents deprived of valued governmental services. 
Eagleton was prepared to make that choice and accept responsibility for 
the outcome of his action.  He did not seek a safe legislative haven which 
would allow him to speak against the bombing but vote to allow it to continue.  
On the contrary, his conduct made clear his commitment to help govern by 
making fundamental choices, not simply to take positions which had limited 
consequences. 
Eagleton acted as he did because he believed the war in Vietnam, including 
the Cambodian bombing, was a mistaken policy.  He also believed that 
Congress needed to reassert its institutional role in order to bring Congress’s 
performance on issues of war and peace in line with constitutional 
prescriptions.  The prescribed system of checks and balances could only 
function if Congress resumed its role. 
Eagleton was disposed, in the vernacular of the day, to “tell it like it was.”  
He did not hesitate to chastise Congress and congressmen for abdicating their 
responsibility and challenged it and them to reclaim the institutional and 
individual roles the Constitution assigned them.  He also criticized the 
American people generally, and the anti-war movement in particular, for not 
being more vociferous in denouncing the bombing. 
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Although Eagleton sought to vindicate principle he was not on a quixotic 
quest indifferent to the practicalities of the issues.  He was a politician with a 
keen sense of what would, or should, work.  He emphasized the possible loss 
of American pilots not only because of the likelihood of that contingency but 
also because he knew that argument resonated with Republican conservatives.  
He repeatedly insisted that Nixon would not veto the continuing resolution 
because he could not imagine Nixon in his weakened state deciding that 
another forty-five days of bombing was worth shutting down the government, 
especially when he could deflect the consequence of a bombing halt to 
Eagleton and his colleagues.  Eagleton was convinced Congress had a winning 
hand if only it had the fortitude to play it. 
Eagleton’s contribution depended on his ability to view the problem from a 
different angle, in modern nomenclature, to think outside the box.  He 
displayed that talent when he conceived the remedy inherent in the Eagleton 
Amendment, of regulating the use of old funds in a new appropriation.  He 
demonstrated that talent again when he led the unsuccessful battle to place the 
Eagleton Amendment in the continuing resolution instead of embracing the 
August 15 Compromise.  Eagleton saw, and deployed, the full range of moral, 
political, and constitutional arguments against the compromise in a way that 
few, if any, of his colleagues did. 
This accomplishment did not depend on intellect alone, although Eagleton 
brought that attribute in abundance.  It also was a testament to his political 
courage.  He was not afraid to think and act independently of the prevailing 
consensus.  Eagleton was willing to put his name on, and accept responsibility 
for, legislation that could lead to a Communist overrun of Vietnam or to 
suspension of government services instead of accepting a popular compromise 
which would deflect blame. 
V.  CONGRESS AND THE AUGUST 15 COMPROMISE 
The Eagleton Amendment led to the conclusion of the bombing of 
Cambodia.  By denying Nixon any funding for the bombing, it forced Nixon to 
seek the face-saving224 August 15 Compromise.  But the Fulbright 
Compromise was not the untarnished triumph which some depicted.  Why did 
Congress agree to give Nixon an additional six weeks to bomb Cambodia?  
And what did that action teach about Congress? 
If the vote on the supplemental appropriation was a reliable guide, the 
sentiment in both houses overwhelmingly opposed Nixon’s policy of bombing 
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Cambodia.  Like the American people, members of Congress wanted the war 
to end.  That sentiment was particularly strong in the Senate. 
Had Nixon refused to bargain, perhaps the Senate would have continued to 
support the Eagleton Amendment.  Yet Nixon did not want the continuing 
resolution or debt ceiling legislation to come to him encumbered with the 
Eagleton Amendment.  That would have presented him two unappealing 
choices: sign the legislation and accordingly accept the Eagleton Amendment 
or veto it and risk the wrath of those inconvenienced by a government shut 
down.  Nixon needed a third way. 
The six week extension allowed Nixon to save some face but gave him 
little substantive benefit.  Once the North Vietnamese knew Nixon’s freedom 
to bomb was time-limited, they had little incentive to negotiate.  Kissinger later 
concluded that the forty-five day extension was worth little.  “An announced 
deadline was marginally better than an immediate cutoff but equally certain to 
destroy prospects for a cease-fire.”225  Nixon could, and did, rain torrents of 
bombs on Cambodia; contrary to the assurances which some senators relied 
upon, he escalated the bombing.226  But he gained very little in negotiating 
strength, if anything, by that exercise which the extension allowed. 
It was almost inevitable that Congress would accept the Compromise.  
Those congressmen with relatively weak commitments to the Eagleton 
Amendment were attracted to a compromise which would avert a 
constitutional confrontation and eliminate the risk of a shut down.  Once Nixon 
was willing to deal, those least committed to Eagleton’s position switched. 
Yet that group, the Republican conservatives and moderates in both 
parties, were not the ones who made the case for the August 15 Compromise 
during the June 29 debate.  The more interesting question was not why 
Congress was inclined to make a deal but why certain senators were.  The 
supporters of the August 15 Compromise included some of the leading critics 
of the war—Fulbright, McGovern, Church, Symington, Case, Javits, and 
Nelson among them.  Why did they embrace the Fulbright Compromise? 
It is entirely possible that somewhat different motives influenced different 
members.  Some members of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee may 
have anticipated attrition in support for the Eagleton Amendment once Nixon 
began to negotiate and may have felt compelled to position themselves in front 
of their nominal followers.  Some members of the Senate Foreign Relations 
Committee, which had long been associated with anti-war activity, may have 
been unhappy that the Appropriations Committee had taken the lead to end the 
bombing.  Were senators with long-standing dove credentials jealous that 
Eagleton, a freshman senator, had put his name on an issue with which they 
had long been identified?  It is unlikely that Eagleton’s close friend Gaylord 
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Nelson and his Missouri colleague, Stuart Symington, felt this way but some of 
the others may have harbored such resentment.  Were senators simply anxious 
to conclude their work to go home for the July 4 recess? 
For many, the August 15, 1973 Compromise maximized benefits while 
reducing risk.  The electoral incentive, David Mayhew pointed out, rewards 
congressional position-taking more than legislative accomplishment.227  
Having already voted for the Eagleton Amendment, senators could articulate 
their opposition to the bombing while presenting their support for the August 
15 cutoff as a vote to end the war.  Many of those who supported the Fulbright 
Compromise on June 29—Fulbright, Church, McGovern, etc.—did so while 
strenuously denouncing the bombing they were allowing to continue.  To the 
public, the difference between the Eagleton and Fulbright positions was subtle.  
It is unlikely that voters would punish support of the August 15 cutoff or give 
greater reward to one who supported the Eagleton Amendment. 
The Eagleton Amendment presented congressmen a much greater risk, 
however.  If it provoked a veto, some Americans would be inconvenienced as 
their services were interrupted or delayed.  They might direct some of their 
anger at those congressmen who placed higher value on ending the bombing 
than keeping services flowing. 
The debate revealed the disposition of congressmen to compromise.  
Senator Fritz Hollings, for instance, rejected Eagleton’s arguments which 
invoked “principle.”228  “Government is the art of the possible.  It is the art of 
compromise,”229 he said.  To be sure, legislation requires compromise and 
governing often requires accepting what is achievable even if it falls short of 
aspirations.  Surely our constitutional system contemplates compromises, not 
simply within a legislative body but between House and Senate, and between 
the Legislative and Executive Branches.  The Senate was in a tough spot.  
Sentiment against the bombing in the Senate was far greater there than in the 
House.230  And the Executive Branch preferred to continue the bombing 
although Kissinger later confessed that few—primarily Nixon, Kissinger, and 
Alexander Haig—really embraced the bombing.231 
Yet the Fulbright Compromise was not an ordinary legislative compromise 
in which competing interests may find an accommodation between allocating a 
higher or lower sum of money for a program or imposing a tougher or more 
lenient standard.  It involved a compromise, among other things, between the 
belief implicit in the Eagleton Amendment that the Cambodian bombing was 
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not constitutionally authorized and President Nixon’s determination to 
continue bombing. 
Whether Congress had authorized the prior bombing of Cambodia 
generally is a somewhat intricate question beyond the scope of this discussion.  
Congress had appropriated funds from 1970 to 1973 with knowledge of the 
bombing.232  Yet Nixon had justified the bombing to protect American troops 
in Vietnam.233  Presumably Congress’s support for bombing Cambodia until 
March 28, 1973 reflected that purpose.  Once the troops came home in late 
March 1973, that rationale vanished. 
The administration believed the President’s power as Commander in Chief 
authorized the bombing without any congressional approval.234  Accepting for 
a moment that position as a sincerely asserted constitutional stance would 
create an impasse between the constitutional interpretations of the Legislative 
and Executive Branches.  Absent Supreme Court adjudication, which seemed 
unlikely, the branches would need to resolve their differences.  Presumably at 
times Supreme Court justices strike compromises between competing 
constitutional assertions in order to resolve conflicts.  It would not be 
unreasonable for the Executive and Legislative Branches to strike a similar 
accord. 
Yet this analysis assumes that both sides are asserting credible 
constitutional positions.  The claim that the Executive could bomb Cambodia 
hardly so qualified.  Whatever the merits of Nixon’s claim before March 29, 
1973, it lost much of its validity once the war in Vietnam ended and the troops 
were safely home.  Thus, the Executive at best offered a somewhat dubious 
constitutional claim against the compelling one implicit in the Eagleton 
Amendment that congressional assent was necessary. 
More important for present purposes, the architects of the Fulbright 
Compromise regarded Nixon’s position as constitutionally untenable.  
Fulbright asserted that, “I do not recognize the constitutional right or power of 
the Executive to continue bombing.  Many of us do not believe he has a 
constitutional right to do this in Cambodia.”235  Under questioning from 
Eagleton, Fulbright repeated that position.  It was not “legal or constitutional” 
for Nixon to continue to bomb Cambodia until August 15, 1973.236  Nixon had 
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“the power to do it because under our system there is not any easy way to stop 
him” but he did not have the “right to do it.”237 
In essence Fulbright et al. were willing to strike a compromise which 
would allow Nixon to pursue for forty-five days more a bombing policy they 
regarded as unconstitutional in order to secure his approval for that timetable.  
In other contexts the Court has held that political decision-makers cannot 
bargain away constitutional safeguards in order to assure contemporary 
goals.238  On Senator Fulbright’s interpretation, the Fulbright Compromise 
would seem to violate that doctrine.  As Eagleton later put it, “Little would be 
accomplished legislatively without negotiation and compromise.  But in the 
war-making area the Constitution is unyielding in its specificity.  It gives 
Congress the exclusive power to authorize war.  My view is that that power 
cannot be compromised.”239 
In fact, however, the Fulbright Compromise was more problematic than 
even this analysis suggests.  The claim of Senator Fulbright and his colleagues 
that the Compromise did not sanction Nixon’s continued bombing was 
incredible.  Everyone knew that Nixon would continue bombing Cambodia 
unless denied the means to do so.240  On its face the Fulbright Compromise 
said that “no funds herein heretofore, or hereafter appropriated” could be used 
to finance activities of American military forces in Vietnam, Laos, or 
Cambodia on or after August 15, 1973.241  The Fulbright Compromise clearly 
denied Nixon funds to bomb Cambodia on and after August 15, 1973 but not 
before that date.  As John Hart Ely nicely put it, “telling your kids to be home 
by midnight gives them permission to stay out until then.”242  Fulbright et al. 
wanted to claim the benefit of Nixon’s agreement to stop bombing on or after 
August 15, 1973 but not accept responsibility for its cost, essentially 
authorizing him to continue bombing until then by their acquiescence in the 
Fulbright Compromise.243 
To be sure, as Senator Church and others pointed out, senators had 
previously supported timetables for withdrawals without anyone suggesting 
that they were authorizing rather than limiting the war.244  But the August 15 
cutoff differed from withdrawal timetables previously considered.  Until the 
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Gulf of Tonkin Resolution was repealed it clearly authorized Johnson and 
Nixon to use force in Vietnam.245  Therefore, appropriating funds subject to a 
cutoff was not extending any authority that did not already exist.  Once the 
Resolution was repealed in 1971, a timetable still could be justified to protect 
American troops until they could be removed.  By June 29, 1973, this rationale 
had collapsed.246 
If the Fulbright Compromise was the only way to end the bombing, its 
proponents might have legitimately claimed that they had no option.  But it 
was not the only course.  Putting aside time-consuming remedies like 
impeachment and removal or litigation, there were at least two other possible 
routes which might or would have forced Nixon to stop the bombing before 
August 15. 
Congress could have passed the Eagleton Amendment as part of the 
continuing resolution and/or as part of legislation to raise the debt ceiling.  If 
Nixon vetoed such legislation, sufficient votes might not have existed to 
override.  But would Nixon have vetoed such legislation at the cost of shutting 
down much of the federal government and leaving many beneficiaries without 
needed services?  Would Nixon value bombing Cambodia for forty-five more 
days as worth the enormous costs of a veto? 
It is impossible to know.  Yet Nixon had reason to avoid a confrontation 
with Congress.  His problems with Watergate were worsening.  On April 29, 
1973 he had accepted resignations of his two closest aides, H. R. Haldeman 
and John Ehrlichman, his counsel John Dean, and his Attorney General 
Richard Kleindienst.247  Dean had already provided damaging testimony 
against him.  Nixon’s popularity had plummeted.  His disapproval ratings 
equaled his approval rating in the end of May 1973.248  By July 3, 1973, a few 
days after the vote on the Eagleton Amendment, Gallup found only 39% 
approved Nixon’s handling of the presidency whereas 49% disapproved.249  A 
clear majority in Congress favored the Eagleton Amendment, and it is unlikely 
that much national passion was committed to continuing the bombing of 
Cambodia.250  How would the embattled President have justified that action to 
a nation fatigued by the war in Southeast Asia?  If Nixon relented, he could 
blame Congress for any adverse consequences in Vietnam.  Eagleton did not 
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think Nixon would veto the legislation and thought it worth calling the 
President’s bluff.251 
Mondale suggested an alternative, creative approach.  Whereas the 
Eagleton approach required Congress to assert its power by passing legislation, 
the Mondale approach imagined Congress refusing to legislate to raise the debt 
ceiling or pass a continuing resolution.252  Whereas the Eagleton approach ran 
the risk of a presidential veto, the Mondale approach denied Nixon that choice.  
Whereas the Eagleton approach put the decision on Nixon’s desk, the Mondale 
approach denied Nixon any participation since Congress made the decision 
itself. 
As between the two roads, the Eagleton Amendment would seem the more 
likely one, at least as a next step once the House failed to override the veto of 
the supplemental appropriation.  Nixon might have signed the legislation with 
a blast at Congress for failing to support our freedom loving allies in Southeast 
Asia.  In that case the bombing would end, the government would continue to 
function, and the only risk to Congress would be if the cessation of bombing 
proved improvident and voters were disposed to punish their congressmen for 
their votes.  Alternatively, Nixon might have vetoed the legislation because of 
the Eagleton Amendment.  That might have resulted in a cessation of some 
government services.  Nixon, not Congress, would seem likely to shoulder 
most of the public’s displeasure if that occurred.  Congress could always 
eliminate the Eagleton Amendment at that point.  By contrast, the Mondale 
approach would have put the burden on Congress for shutting down the 
government. 
Regardless of the likely outcome of these counterfactuals the important 
point is that contrary to the claims of Fulbright et al., the Eagleton and 
Mondale approaches show that Congress did have alternatives to the August 15 
Compromise.  They were not pleasant choices.  They presented risks and 
uncertainties.  But they were options. 
Senator Pastore characterized the choice facing the Senate as one between 
two evils.253  Of course his characterization of the Eagleton Amendment as an 
“evil” presumes that its presence would cause Nixon to veto the continuing 
resolution, thereby causing a government crisis.254  If Eagleton was right in 
predicting that Nixon would sign the measure, Eagleton’s Amendment would 
have represented the immediate realization of the dreams of the advocates of 
the August 15 Compromise.  Even if one accepts Senator Pastore’s 
characterization of the choice the question remains why the Senate thought the 
Fulbright Compromise the lesser evil. 
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Many proponents of the Fulbright Compromise tended to identify its 
benefits but not its costs.  The benefits were that the bombing would end in 
forty-five days without any interruption of needed governmental services.255  
Otherwise, the “immorality” would “go on for God knows how long,” Senator 
Pastore reasoned.256  The alternative, said Senator Church, was “a futile debate, 
flouting our impotence.”257  Moreover, the Fulbright Compromise offered the 
promise of executive-legislative cooperation; it avoided confrontation and 
gridlock.  There were, however, costs to the Fulbright Compromise.  They 
included the following: 
(1)  Unknown numbers of innocent Cambodian people would die or be 
wounded, and the country would suffer further devastation; 
(2)  American pilots might be killed, wounded, or captured; 
(3)  Congress would suffer further institutional decline.  If Fulbright et al. were 
right that the Fulbright Compromise did not authorize six weeks of bombing, 
then the Compromise represented a congressional abdication of its 
constitutional duty to determine when the nation goes to war.  If the Fulbright 
Compromise did in effect authorize the bombing, Congress would have 
associated itself in an action many of its members thought immoral because 
they concluded they lacked the institutional power to protect their turf. 
(4)  The Fulbright Compromise abandoned the chance that Nixon would sign 
legislation with the Eagleton Amendment.258 
Those who supported the Compromise tended to ignore its costs and to 
overstate some of the benefits.  Absent the Fulbright Compromise, would the 
bombing of Cambodia have continued for “God knows how long”?  Only if 
Congress did not act to stop it.  Would Congress reveal its “impotence”?  
Senator Church’s suggestion had the character of a self-fulfilling prophecy.  
And did the Fulbright Compromise really herald a new age of cooperation? 
Comparing the benefits and costs make the Fulbright Compromise look 
less attractive.  Such a comparison would, of course, require senators to 
evaluate the relative worth of different types of costs and benefits.  How does 
one compare the value of the additional Cambodian lives lost to the 
inconvenience to Americans denied certain government services?  How does 
one measure the security of a resolution of the war against the failure to assert 
constitutional power?  One suspects that many senators could imagine irate 
constituents hurt by interruption of government services; the Cambodians 
needed to depend on surrogate representation of the war movement.  And, as 
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Eagleton pointed out, it had grown silent as the draft ended and the troops 
came home.259 
In fall 1973, Eagleton put the events in perspective.  He wrote: 
As the author of the amendment which placed the President in the position of 
having to compromise on June 29, I was naturally pleased when, on August 15, 
our long involvement in Indochina finally came to an end.  But I cannot agree 
that Congress is ready to assume its constitutional role in the war-making area.  
The compromise demonstrated to me, even more clearly than the years of 
congressional silence during the Vietnam experience, the extent to which 
congressional awareness of its own war-making responsibilities had been 
eroded.260 
Almost thirty-five years later, that analysis continues to ring true.  To be 
sure, Congress, led by the likes of Eagleton, pushed Nixon to accept a 
compromise to end an unpopular military effort.  Yet ultimately, Congress 
blinked rather than maintaining its support of an immediate cutoff.  If Congress 
would not hold firm in a battle with a weakened President headed for 
impeachment when the troops were already home, it is hard to imagine when it 
will flex its appropriation power to reclaim its constitutional role and 
responsibility. 
 
 259. Id. at 12724. 
 260. Eagleton, supra note 239. 
SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW 
186 SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 52:151 
 
